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ABSTRACT 
 
With the increase in the number of people who had a stake in the Stock market coupled with 9/11 
and Enron (which created a climate of uncertainty); a need was created for more assurance in the 
Stock market.  Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) was created to answer the need for accuracy and reliability 
of financial reporting. SOX imposed unprecedented close government oversight of publicly traded 
companies through rigid internal control of corporate processes.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he increase in the number of Americans invested in the stock market, coupled with the accounting 
scandals such as Enron and WorldCom, led to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) in 2002. SOX 
imposed close government oversight of publicly traded companies.  
 
The cost of compliance for large first tier companies turned out to be exceptionally high. With small and 
medium size companies now required to comply, there is concern that the competitive costs will be disastrous.   A 
possible solution is Scaling and Tailoring.  This article will examine the background and competitive aspects of 
Sarbanes-Oxley and will look at Scaling and Tailoring as a possible solution for the problems facing small and 
medium size companies and a possible standard for compliance in global markets.   
 
PROBLEM 
 
The first reporting tier-the large firms required to comply with the new law-has experienced a high cost of 
compliance.  The cost of this type of compliance based on the “worst case” scenario threatens the financial viability 
of the small and mid-size companies.  The tangible costs include extensive sustained legal and accountancy 
consultation and manpower costs for additional professional compliance personnel. The intangible costs include 
disruption of company processes through internal reorganization and refocusing on compliance objectives at the 
expense of business objectives. This disruption will have a commensurate adverse affect on the company‟s ability to 
compete. Can mid-level companies create shareholder value through compliance enhanced transparency? Can these 
companies improve competitive position and increase profitability by implementing a compliant internal control 
infrastructure specifically designed for that company?   What is the potential effect on the U.S. economy from loss 
of competitive position while achieving compliance?  These questions take on added significance, since there is a 
tremendous international interest in the United States approach to this problem.    This interest is taking on special 
urgency since U.S. and International Accounting Standards are going through a process of harmonization.  The 
expectation is that the process will be completed in the next year or two, resulting in the U.S. and the rest of the 
global community using the same set of accounting standards for compliant financial reporting.  Additionally, in 
light of the most recent events in the global financial markets, one of the mantras to emerge from the credit 
meltdown is a need to increase government oversight. 
T 
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BACKGROUND 
 
In the United States, the percentage of families that are invested in the stock market has grown 
tremendously.  In 2001, stock ownership in the United States had increased to the point where one out of every two 
families had a stake in the stock market.  From1962 through 2001 the percentage of families who were involved in 
the stock market had increased from 18% to 51.9% (Projector, 1964) (Aizcorbe, Kennickell, & Moore, 2003).  
 
With the increase in the number of people who were affected by the vagaries of the stock market, coupled 
with 9/11 and the fall of Enron and the corporate dominos that went down afterward, the very stability of U.S. 
financial markets was threatened through a climate of uncertainty.  Globally, the large U.S. corporate failures were 
dwarfed by the implosion of Parmalat and its fallout on the world economy.  In the United States, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was fast-tracked by Congress in order to answer the need for accuracy and reliability of 
financial reporting.  This need was addressed by mandating properly designed and effective internal control 
infrastructure within a company to minimize fraud.  To enforce this requirement, SOX originally imposed 
unprecedented close government oversight of publicly traded companies in phases beginning in November of 2004 
(Samuel, Sabot & DelPiano, 2008).  
 
WILL SOX-LIKE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS GO GLOBAL? 
 
There is serious international interest in the United States‟ approach to the need for accuracy and reliability 
of financial reporting.  This interest is taking on special urgency since U.S. and International Accounting Standards 
are currently going through a process of international harmonization.  The European Union (EU) and the United 
States have established a joint work plan for bridging differences between the U.S. and International accounting 
standards. (McCollum, 2006). 
 
The plan is designed to address conflicts between the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
and the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) required for financial reporting by publicly traded U.S. 
companies under SOX.  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) now permits foreign private issuers to 
submit IFRS-based reports and has announced that EU companies listed in the United States could submit IFRS-
based reports beginning in 2009 (McCollum, 2006), (Parrott, 2008). 
 
The SEC is currently considering whether to allow U.S. domestic companies a choice between GAAP and 
IFRS. (Parrott, 2008).  In the long run, there is an even larger question. Should the SEC shed its former allegiance to 
GAAP and throw its weight behind international reporting standards (Turley, 2008)? 
 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) does not favor allowing U.S. domestic companies a 
choice between IFRS and GAAP. (Parrott, 2008).  Robert Herz, chairman of FASB, recently suggested establishing 
a target date for transitioning to IFRS as the sole auditing standard for financial reporting.  Likewise, the top four 
certified public accounting (CPA) firms prefer a shift to IFRS.  Mr. Turley (2007), chairman and CEO of Ernst & 
Young said that “we will weigh in with strong support for the SEC to set a certain date for a shift to IFRS”. 
 
The harmonization process between GAAP and IFRS should eventually lead to consideration of SOX-like 
transparency in financial reporting.  Ultimately, SOX or some variant of it will probably become the global standard 
(Samuel, Sabot & DelPiano, 2008). 
 
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL ADVERSE EFFECTS RESULTING FROM COMPLIANCE? 
 
So far the first tier accelerated large companies, defined as greater than $700 million in market 
capitalization, (United States Government Accountability Office, 2006) reporting under SOX have been required to 
comply with the new requirements for financial reporting under Section 404, (the focus is not on reporting merely 
what the numbers are, but the emphasis is reporting on how and why those numbers were obtained) with virtually no 
guidance from the SEC or Congress.  Consequently, these companies worked on the “worst case” scenario to 
achieve compliance with these new and stricter requirements.  These first tier companies survived this difficult 
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transition.  However, this was accomplished at a tremendous cost.  Other companies have chosen to avoid these 
requirements by going private or by initially listing outside the United States (Daks, 2006).   
 
The cost of compliance based on the “worst case” scenario threatens the financial viability of these 
companies. The tangible costs include extensive sustained legal and accountancy consultation and manpower costs 
for additional professional compliance personnel. The intangible costs include disruption of company processes 
through internal reorganization and refocusing on compliance objectives at the expense of business objectives. This 
disruption will have a commensurate adverse affect on the company‟s ability to compete. Can mid-level companies 
create shareholder value through compliance enhanced transparency? Can these companies improve competitive 
position and increase profitability by implementing a compliant internal control infrastructure specifically designed 
for that company?   What is the potential effect on the U.S. economy from loss of competitive position while 
achieving compliance (Samuel, Sabot & DelPiano, 2008)? 
 
COMPETITIVENESS 
 
The cost for large company compliance with Sox has been very expensive.  According to a survey 
commissioned by the top four CPA firms, Section 404 compliance costs in its initial year averaged more than $8.5 
million.  In addition, related costs for proxy audit services averaged another $2 million in the first year of 
implementation (CRA International, 2006).  With costs of this magnitude, it is hard to imagine that the competitive 
position of these public U.S. companies, compared to that of non-public U.S. companies or foreign companies, 
could not be adversely impacted.  Just imagine the effect of even smaller compliance costs on small and medium 
public companies.  This situation poses real potential for inducing competitive financial disaster within this group of 
companies. 
 
 Although larger public companies decreased their spending in the second year to an average of $4.7 million 
on Section 404 compliance costs and an average of $1,570,000 on proxy audit costs, the potential outcome could 
still be devastating for small and medium public companies (CRA International, 2006). 
 
The repercussions of the high cost of compliance and its effect on the competitive position of U.S. 
companies were not long in coming. There was a rising demand in corporate and some government sectors that SOX 
should be scrapped altogether.  Even Alan Greenspan who gave SOX his blessing in a May 2005 address to the 
Wharton School of Business (Greenspan, 2005), reversed his position in November 2006 and called for its 
dismantling.  “According to the former Fed chief, Sarbanes-Oxley regulations hamper business, discourage risk-
taking and drive foreign companies to shun the New York stock exchange for London (Greenspan, 2006).”  
 
However, competition is a multi-faceted concept with many variables dependent upon the context and 
culture in which competitive business activity occurs.  Supporters of SOX raised another variable of competition, 
global investor confidence.   Competition in global financial markets is increasingly focusing upon financial 
transparency as a critical point in capturing investor interest. 
 
In the financial markets of the United States, transparency through close government oversight evolved 
from the paralyzing impact of the Enron financial fraud implosion on investor confidence.   Of course, investor 
confidence is not a concern limited only to the United States.  One only needs to survey the fallout from the 
Parmalat disaster to understand this fact in the European context.  Investor confidence and financial transparency 
form a simple but potent relationship that is having a far reaching and profound effect on global financial markets. 
Transparency has been defined as “the quantity and quality of information a company provides it‟s various 
constituents including shareholders and other capital providers, suppliers, customers, employees [and others]” 
(Churchwell & Cynthia, 2003).   
 
Many studies have examined the role of corporate governance, top management turnover, ownership 
structure, CEO/chairman duality, top executive turnover, board composition, global and industrial diversification, 
and types of compensation as each relates to shareholder value (Doukas and Travlos 1988), (Freund, Trahan, and 
Vasudevan 2007), (Doukas and Kan 2006), (Kang and Shivdasani 1995). Theories focused on in these studies have 
included agency, corporate multi-nationalism, internalization, synergy, managerialism and bonding.   
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Studies by Charitou, Louca, and Panayides (2007), Foerster and Karolyi, (1993), and Eun and Saherwal 
(1993) of cross-listed companies (foreign companies also listed on U.S. exchanges) have been done to determine 
what benefits or costs are derived from listing on the U.S. as well as the home market.  The benefits examined have 
included liquidity, lower cost of capital, increased trading volume, and price discovery.  The additional cost 
considerations include: accounting, legal, and possibly additional taxes. The share price of companies prior to and 
after cross-listing has been measured to determine whether abnormal gains were produced. 
 
A review of the literature indicates the significance of continued examination of foreign companies that 
choose to cross-list in the US despite the additional cost of compliance related to SOX.  A significant body of 
literature exists today with cost benefit analysis of SOX, with many different conclusions.  This is a result of the 
many variables affecting the stock market, corporate earnings and shareholder values.   
 
Various studies have looked at different corporate governance mechanisms as it relates to firm value.  Kang 
and Shivdasani (1995) studied Japanese firms and found a negative relationship between non-routine top executive 
turnover likelihood and firm performance as measured by earnings relative to other firms in the industry.  Their 
study established that the main bank system in Japan performs an important governance function and that outside 
succession is more likely for firms with large shareholders.  
 
Zhu and Small (2007) reviewed the literature looking at the concerns of financial professionals who were 
questioning  the cost of SOX  and whether or not it had a chilling effect on the cross-listings of international 
companies in U.S. markets.  The result of their study indicated that there are several motives for cross-listing, 
including a desire to increase the visibility of the company, to tap into a more liquid market, to signal strength, or to 
follow tougher exchange requirements.  This allows investors to take advantage of international diversification (Zhu 
and Small, 2007).  
 
Charitou, et. al. (2007) examined the relationship between cross-listing and corporate governance for 
Canadian firms cross-listed on U.S. stock exchanges.  The study found that cross-listed firms experience changes in 
their ownership structure after listing and that cross-listed firms have more independent boards and audit committees 
after listing compared to a matched sample of non-cross-listed companies and relative to the pre-listing period.  The 
study was of companies cross-listed between the years 1997-2003 and statistics run for one year prior to listing and 
one year after being cross-listed.  The authors found corporate governance does not have an impact on the decision 
to cross-list.  However, improvements that relate to the independence of board and audit committees were only 
found in cross-listed firms.  
 
Foerster and Karolyi (1993) also studied Canadian companies cross-listed on U.S. exchanges.  They found 
expected stock returns for the overall sample significantly lower subsequent to cross-listing and that stock liquidity 
substantially increased when cross-listed.  The stocks significantly increased 100 days prior to cross-listing and 
during the cross-listing period, but significantly dropped in the 100 days after cross-listing.  
 
Another study of U.S. listed Canadian stocks was done by Eun and Sabherwal (2003). The study looked at 
62 firms traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange that were cross-listed on a U.S. exchange covering a six month 
period in 1998.  The purpose was to examine the contribution of cross-listing to price discovery.  They found that 
prices on the Toronto exchange and U.S. exchanges were co-integrated and mutually adjusting.  Price adjustments 
due to cross-market information flows took place on the Toronto as well as U.S. exchanges.  Therefore, U.S. 
exchanges also contributed to price discovery.  
 
No studies have been done with statistics completely post SOX. Therefore, the increases in reporting 
requirements have not been taken into consideration by previous studies.   
 
One of the authors of this paper, Delpiano, in conjunction with Chin-Loy (Delpiano & Chin-Loy, 2008)  
decided to rectify the situation somewhat by studying Canadian firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) 
cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for the years 2005 – 2007 versus Canadian only listed firms, 
to examine the effect of SOX on shareholder value.  The key research questions in this study were as follows: Do 
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Canadian companies that become cross-listed add firm value after a three year period?  Is there a difference in 
corporate governance between Canadian only and cross-listed Canadian stocks? 
 
A comparison of cross-listed Canadian companies on both the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) with Canadian only listed stocks on the TSX, was made to establish if there is 
firm value added by such cross-listing.  Board composition, net profit margin, and change in chief 
executive/chairman duality were also considered in this study.  While one such study (Charitou, et. al. 2007) exists, 
this study examined a longer time period and with some different variables, and the period covered was almost 
completely pre SOX (1997-2003).  The number of internationally cross-listed stocks in 1997 was 4,700 and this 
number declined to 2,300 by the end of 2002 (Karolyi, 2006). 
 
 At the time of the study there were 79 Canadian companies cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) which is the dataset for this study. These firms were identified from the NYSE website.  To qualify for this 
study a company needed to have been cross-listed from the TSX to the NYSE prior to January 2005 (the original 
SOX compliance date was November, 2004). 
 
The final sample consisted of thirty-one companies.  Companies eliminated from the study included those 
cross-listed after December 2004, ones that merged with other firms after 2004, mutual funds or trusts that do not 
operate a business, firms with unavailable governance data or firms that could not be matched with like businesses 
solely listed on the TSX.  December 2004 is used as the cut-off to be able to compare three years of data (2005 – 
2007) for these cross-listed companies, under SOX requirements, with their Canadian only listed counterparts. The 
companies were paired with Canadian firms listed on the TSX only. The matching was determined by industry and 
amount of revenue. The purpose was to determine the effect of SOX during the 2005 through 2007 period to the 
cross-listed firms, compared to the Canadian cross-listed firms.  Governance data was retrieved from statements 
filed with the Security and Exchange Commission and the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval 
as well as corporate annual reports.  
 
The bonding hypothesis was tested in this study. The bonding hypothesis credits premiums resulting from 
cross-listing to the bond that forms between stockholders and managers when non U.S. firms relent to U.S. 
regulations.  The increased enforcement by the SEC may reduce information asymmetry between the management 
of the firm and its shareholders (Charitou, et. al.).  Thus, it was expected that the increased reporting due to being 
listed on the NYSE would create value to the shareholders. The study utilized the independent t-test to perform 
analysis on the data. 
 
 The following hypotheses were proposed:  Hypothesis 1: Canadian firms cross-listed on the NYSE would 
have boards of directors with a greater percentage of outside directors than Canadian firms solely listed on the TSX.  
Hypothesis 2: Canadian firms cross-listed on the NYSE would have a higher net profit margin than Canadian firms 
solely listed on the TSX.  Hypothesis 3: Canadian firms cross-listed on the NYSE would have a lower percentage of 
CEO/Chairman Duality than those firms solely on the TSX. 
 
The results show that the percentage of inside directors is significantly higher for TSX only listed 
companies.  Specifically, the average of inside directors of TSX only firms ranges from 19 to 20.6%, while cross-
listed companies average between 11.7 and 12.4%.  The independent t-test performed showed this to be statistically 
significant.  It was expected that cross-listed companies would have a higher net profit margin than those listed 
solely on the TSX.  No significant difference was found from the independent t-test performed.  It is noteworthy, 
however, that the average for the cross-listed companies increased from an average return of 9.2% in 2005 to 15.3% 
in 2007.  The TSX only listed companies performed better than the cross-listed firms in 2005 and 2006.  
 
Duality of the CEO/chairman was expected to be higher with TSX listed firms and this did not prove to be 
statistically significant from the results of the study.  TSX only listed companies had 29% dual CEO/chairmen in 
2005 and 23% in both 2006 and 2007.  Cross-listed companies had 13% in each of the three years. 
 
The purpose of the study was to look at the effect of SOX on corporate governance and profitability. The 
results of the study show that there is a statistically significant difference in board independence between 
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NYSE/TSX cross-listed companies and those firms listed only on the TSX.  The bonding hypothesis, however, 
which credits premiums resulting from cross-listing to the bond that forms between stockholders and managers 
when non U.S. firms submit to U.S. regulations, cannot be confirmed.   
 
The results of the study do not give significant credence to the thesis that the competitive value added 
through SOX corporate transparency in terms of investor confidence outweighs the demonstrated high competitive 
losses of SOX compliance for large public companies.  The perception was that for small and Medium public 
companies SOX compliance could be a disaster.  Witness the United States Government Accountability Office study 
(2006) “However, for smaller public companies (defined in this report as $700 million or less in market 
capitalization), the cost of compliance has been disproportionately higher (as a percentage of revenues) than for 
large public companies, particularly with respect to the internal control reporting provisions in section 404 and 
related audit fees.” (p. 2).  Something needed to be done (Samuel, Sabot & DelPiano, 2008). 
 
SCALING AND TAILORING 
 
In the political/legislative haste to address the crisis in market confidence caused by 9/11 and the Enron 
debacle, legislators failed to include any guidance.  In addition to this lack of guidance, the legislative rush to issue a 
law with minimum debate resulted in a relative lack of legislative history for purposes of interpretation of the law as 
well as any guidance for publicly traded companies to achieve the new regulatory requirements.  The lack of 
practical, administrative guidance caused the larger companies to engage in “trial and error” compliance at great 
expense of funds and manpower, distracting primary business focus to compliance instead of competition.   
 
This unguided “trial and error” approach was weathered by the large companies, but raised serious 
questions about the financial and manpower abilities of the smaller companies to comply.  Moreover, there were 
concerns whether the costs of this new regulatory compliance by middle level and small level publicly traded 
companies threatened their financial viability and diminished their competitive position by focusing company 
resources on the regulatory compliance effort.  These circumstances caused the SEC to come up with an innovative 
solution. (KPMG, 2007).  A new concept of “scaling and tailoring” internal control infrastructure was examined and 
implemented in 2008. “Scaling and tailoring” runs parallel with the inexorable movement toward harmonized 
auditing standards in global financial markets.  It may well begin to pose answers to the challenge of achieving 
compliance and maintaining or even increasing competitive position.   
 
Between 2005 and 2007, through intense political and business interest pressure, the SEC was forced to 
take a hard look at the costs of compliance and transparency for the smaller, second and third tier publicly traded 
companies.  The SEC with its accounting oversight board, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB), referring to emerging principles set out by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO), looked at corporate governance, internal control infrastructure and external (public) audit and 
produced a composite approach to compliance.  This approach involved “scaling and tailoring” the internal control 
infrastructure through prioritized, risk based assessment of the corporate processes most likely to be vulnerable to 
fraud.  “Scaling and tailoring” could be a silver bullet of sorts to achieve regulatory compliance in a controlled cost 
environment, potentially enhancing competitive position through established transparency. 
 
The Treadway Commission was sponsored jointly by five major professional associations headquartered in 
the United States: the American Accounting Association (AAA), the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA), Financial Executives International (FEI), The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), and the 
National Association of Accountants (now the Institute of Management Accountants [IMA]). Wholly independent of 
each of the sponsoring organizations, the Commission contained representatives from industry, public accounting, 
investment firms, and the New York Stock Exchange. 
 
From the outset of SOX, the SEC received constant demands for additional guidance to achieve the levels 
of compliance demanded by the Act. (SEC, 2007).  Unlike the first tier large companies that had no guidance from 
SOX or the SEC on how to achieve compliance, the SEC, as of June 27, 2007, provided "interpretive guidance" for 
smaller companies in the second and third tiers for achieving compliance on a flexible basis through a process 
termed "scaling and tailoring." (SEC, 2007).   
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As part of this guidance, the SEC took great care to define its idea of effective "internal control over 
financial reporting" (IFCR).  The SEC went to great lengths to demonstrate that effective IFCR means "reasonable 
assurance" and not absolute assurance. (SEC, 2007).   
 
The SEC noted that internal controls can be defeated by both intentional and unintentional fraud.  However, 
"it is possible to design into the process safeguards to reduce, though not eliminate, this risk." (@ 35324) 
 
The SEC went on to explain that its Interpretive Guidance is organized around two broad principles.  “The 
first principle is that management should evaluate whether it has implemented controls that adequately address the 
risk that a material misstatement of the financial statements would not be prevented or detected in a timely 
manner….The second principle is that management's evaluation of the evidence about the operation of its controls 
should be based on its assessment of risk". (@ 35325).  
 
Both of these principles are focused upon risk involved in financial reporting.  In assessing the risk of 
"material misstatement" in financial reporting, this new guidance allows the company to focus on identifying 
controls that are most likely to prevent misstatements in the context and circumstances that are unique to that 
company at that time.  In documenting this assessment of risk and internal control, the company has the flexibility to 
select an adequate control to properly address the risk presented.  In other words, the company has the flexibility to 
pick and choose controls to the exclusion of others as long as the controls put in place can be demonstrated by 
supporting documentation to provide reasonable assurance that financial misstatement will not occur.  In short, 
smaller companies have the ability to satisfy SOX 404B financial reporting requirements “scaling and tailoring” 
internal controls to fit the unique circumstances of that company. 
 
The emphasis of the concept of scaling and tailoring is on the company using its "experience and informed 
judgment" to select the right controls to provide reliable financial reporting by selectively choosing internal controls 
appropriate to the nature of that company. (SEC, 2007)  In terms of top down risk-based evaluation of internal 
controls over financial reporting, literally, the company can identify those risks and controls most relevant to 
accurate and reliable financial reporting for that company. 
 
This is a significant departure from the "trial and error" approach forced upon the first tier companies that 
necessarily required something of a shotgun, worst case approach to internal controls to provide reasonable 
assurances against fraudulent financial reporting.  It was the "trial and error” approach that involved enormous cost 
and man hour-expenditures to achieve compliance. 
 
The SEC's purpose in developing this small company guidance and change to the financial reporting rules 
was to insure that the smaller companies would not be hobbled in their capital formation endeavors and in their 
ability to compete with the larger companies. (SEC, 2007) (Samuel, Sabot & DelPiano, 2008). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
With the introduction of scaling and tailoring of internal controls on corporate processes, it may now be 
possible to achieve reasonable assurance that corporate performance information is transparent and reliable for 
investor purposes without overwhelming smaller companies in enormously costly compliance efforts to ensure that 
reliability.  It was this regulatory compliance burden without the guidance of scaling and tailoring imposed on larger 
companies that threatened to diminish the competitive position of smaller companies when their turn came to 
comply.  In light of the most recent events in the global financial markets, one of the mantras to emerge from the 
credit meltdown is a need to increase government oversight.  Consequently, there is a great likelihood that Sarbanes-
like regulatory oversight of financial reporting will be one of the main controls that will be imposed as a partial 
answer to the problems that are now occurring.  Considering the competitive issues raised in this paper, possibly 
some form of scaling and tailoring will go global. 
 
However, by interjecting the subjective element allowing companies to determine their own vulnerabilities 
to fraud in the financial reporting process, have administrators started down the path of dismantling the primary 
objectives inherent in SOX (Samuel, Sabot & DelPiano, 2008)?    
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